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JURY INSTRUCTIONS
HUNG JURIES-ADMONITIONS URGING AGREEMENT AND DIRECTIONS
AS TO METHODS OF DELIBERATION
Following a charge of assault with intent to kill, the defendant pleaded
insanity. On this point the evidence conflicted. After the jury had been out
for fifty-two hours, the judge called them in and instructed that while the
verdict of each juror must be his own and not a mere acquiescence in the
conclusions of others, it was the duty of jurors to agree if they could do so
without yielding conscientious convictions. He further stated that each juror
should listen with a disposition to be convinced by the arguments of the others
and that minority jurors should, since they were outnumbered, consider their
views as possibly unreasonable.'
Fifteen minutes after listening to this instruction the jury returned a
verdict of guilty. Defendant claimed on appeal that the instruction coerced
the jury into arriving at a verdict. It was not coercive, the court held, since it
did not intimate what verdict was to be reached and did not tend to make a
juror yield a conscientious conviction. Defendant also asserted without success that the instruction amounted to a comment on the evidence. 2 State v.
Voeckell, 210 P.2d 972 (Ariz. 1949) .3
Coercive instructions and comments on the evidence, which are related
in that both involve the "inviolability" of jury trials, represent essentially
1.

"...

You are further instructed, members of the jury, that although the verdict

to which each juror agrees, must, of course, be his own verdict and the result of his own
convictions and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet in order to
bring twelve minds to a unanimous result you must examine the question submitted to you
with candor and with proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other. There
is no reason to suppose that this case will ever be submitted to twelve more intelligent,
more impartial or more competent jurors to decide it, or that more or clearer evidence will
be produced on one side or the other. With this in view it is your duty to decide this
case if you can without yielding your conscientious convictions. In conferring together
you ought to pay proper attention to each other's opinions and listen with a disposition
to be convinced by each other's arguments, and, on the other hand, if a larger number of
your panel are for conviction a dissenting juror should consider whether a doubt in his
own mind is a reasonable one which makes no impression on the minds of so many jurors
equally honest, equally intelligent with himself, who have heard the same evidence, with
the same oath; and if on the other hand, the majority are for the defendant the minority
should ask themselves whether they may not and ought to reasonably doubt seriously the
correctness of a judgment which is not concurred in by most of those with whom they are
associated, and distrust the weight and sufficiency of that evidence which fails to carry
conviction to the minds of their fellow jurors *** and with that instruction you will continue your deliberations . . ."

State v. Voeckell, 210 P.2d 972, 974 (Ariz. 1949).

2. ARIZ. CONST. ART. VI, § 12 prohibits trial judges from commenting on the evidence. In Indiana this practice is prohibited by judicial decision. Wood v. Deutchman,
75 Ind. 148 (1881).
3. Comment, 2 STAN. L. REv. 613 (1950) ; 36 VA. L. REv. 110 (1950).
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separate ideas. 4 One argument for the privilege of judges to comment on the
evidence is that they thereby impart to the jury the benefit of valuable experience gained from numerous trials,5 thus lighting the way to the "proper"
verdict. Many writers feel that the issues and evidence in present-day trials,
especially civil cases, are sufficiently complicated that a jury unguided by
judicial remarks can hardly frame the issues or properly ascertain the facts.
Since by this argument a limited discussion of the evidence from the bench is
the guiding force, that thesis does not support a judge's right to urge agreement which, in the absence of comment, is as "unguided" as if the judge had
said nothing. And certainly in the instruction under consideration the remarks
were not comment, that is, did not summarize, clarify, or favor certain evidence.'
There is no doubt that threats to keep the jury impaneled until a verdict
ensues or instructions 7 disparaging the jurors are coercive." Nicer problems
occur when instructions refer to the duty of the jurors to reach a decision,
to the importance of ending a case, to 'the expense and inconvenience of
litigation, or to the manner of deliberation. 9 (Consideration of the latter has
4. Even should the coercion problem be considered as one phase of the comment problem, the outcome of the cases would not be different; for even under the liberal federal
rules regarding comment on the evidence, the trial judge may not comment to a jury
returning without a verdict. Foster v. United States, 188 Fed. 305 (4th Cir. 1911).
5. Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (U. S. 1851) ; M'Lanahan v. The Universal Insurance Co., 1 Pet. 170 (U. S. 1828) ; Kolman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931)
(The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions present a heated discussion of arguments for and against comment.) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§2251, 2251a (3rd ed. 1940) ;
Deane, Civil Jury Should be Abolished, 12 J.Am. JUD. Soc'y 137 (1929) ; Sunderland,
The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REv. 302 (1915).
6. As is apparent from the majority opinion in the Voeckell case, the split in authority regarding the propriety of "verdict urging" instructions does not coincide with the
split regarding the judge's right to comment on the evidence.
7. In relation to requirements that additional instructions of law be given only in
the presence of counsel, admonitions regarding the jury's duty to reach a verdict and
suggested methods of deliberation are not considered instructions. Ashford v. McKee,
183 Ala. 620, 62 So. 879 (1913) ; Burton v. Neill, 140 Iowa 141, 118 N.W. 302 (1908).
But cf. Jones v. Johnson, 61 Ind. 257 (1878). An Indiana statute enacted since the decision in the Jones case would seem to give Indiana the rule that such admonitions are not
instructions. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1946) §2-2017.
Also, court rules regarding time for excepting to instructions do not apply to these
admonitions. See Medows v. State, 182 Ala. 51, 62 So. 737 (1913). This court validly
reasoned that coercive admonitions were not instructions but those regarding the deliberative process were.
These admonitions are for other purposes called instructions in the cases and are so
termed in this note.
8. An exception seems to exist in some jurisdictions if the coercion merely results in
the only verdict that could properly have been given on the merits of the case. Grimes v.
Malcolm, 164 U. S.483 (1896) ; Wilson v. State, 109 Tenn. 167, 70 S.W. 57 (1902).
9. See Pfeiffer v. State, 35 Ariz. 321, 278 Pac. 63 (1929) ; Holmes v. State, 153 Ark.
339, 240 S.W.425 (1922) (threats to keep the jury impaneled until a verdict is reached) ;
Kesley v. United States, 47 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1931) (disparagement of jurors) ; Peterson v. United States, 213 Fed. 920 (9th Cir. 1914) (duty of jurors to reach a verdict) ;
Peavy v. Clemons, 10 Ga. App. 507, 73 S.E. 756 (1912) (importance of ending the case) ;
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often been inaccurately and carelessly made as though this were a problem
indistinguishable from coercion.)
Various tests have been devised to determine the coerciveness of the
more doubtful instructions. One standard requires examination of the evidence. If it favors the prevailing party and is not conflicting, the instruction
will be declared either not coercive' 0 or not prejudicial." Conversely, if the
evidence is in conflict, the instruction will be deemed prejudicial.' 2 Those
appellate courts which apply this test usurp the function of the jury by
weighing the evidence 13 and by granting a new trial for misinstruction only if
they are in doubt about what the verdict should have been.' 4 The use of
this precept is necessarily inconsistent with the proposition that any coercion
is prejudicial regardless of the verdict: the very fact that the jury was undecided' " when the instruction was given shows probability that the proper
triers of fact thought the evidence was conflicting. Had this test been applied
in the present case, reversal would have followed since the evidence on the
question of insanity was inconclusive.
Quite popular because of its simplicity, the time-element test requires a
holding of coercion only if the instruction is followed by a short period of
Knapp v. State, 168 Ind. 153, 79 N.E. 1076 (1906) ; Nicken v. Miller, 59 Ind. App. 115,
108 N.E. 968 (1915); People v. DeMeaux, 194 Mich. 18, 160 N.W. 634 (1916) (deliberative processes).
10. Wilson v. State, 109 Tenn. 167, 70 S.W. 57 (1902).
11. Grimes v. Malcolm, 164 U. S. 483 (1896).
12. Peterson v. United States, 213 Fed. 920 (9th Cir. 1914) ; Peavy v. Clemons, 10
Ga. App. 507, 73 S.E. 756 (1912).
13. Though appellate courts in reviewing rulings on motions for new trials consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, such procedure necessarily presupposes previous fair consideration of the case by the jury. It could hardly be
argued that the reviewing court should even look at the evidence if the defendant had
been improperly denied a jury trial. Although parties should be given no more than one
opportunity to win before a jury, they should not be denied that opportunity as a result of
coercion of the jury. See note 33 infra.
14. IND. CONST. ART. I, § 19, providing that the jury shall be the judge of the law in
criminal cases, seems to put Indiana in no different position on the coercion problem
from that of jurisdictions not having such provisions. Instructions urging agreement are
clearly not instructions as to the law. See note 4 supra. Instructions as to the deliberative process do not deny the jury the right to determine the law but possibly state illegal
methods for the exercise of that right. Thus, the situation in Indiana coincides with that
in other jurisdictions except that in the latter, juries, when following an improper deliberative instruction, determine only the facts improperly.
15. With rare exceptions only instructions given after the jury has returned, or has
been called in, without reaching a verdict are challenged as coercive. As to deliberative
processes, there has been litigation on instructions given both before and after the jury
begins deliberation. See Holmes v. State, 153 Ark. 339, 240 S.W. 425 (1922) (coercive
instruction after deliberation) ; State v. Saunders, 14 Ore. 300, 12 Pac. 441 (1886) (coercive instruction before deliberation) ; State v. Ivanhoe, 35 Ore. 150, 57 Pac. 317 (1899)
(deliberative instruction after jury has been called back) ; Knapp v. State, 168 Ind. 153,
79 N.E. 1076 (1906) (deliberative instruction before the jury retired).
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deliberation.16 Although strongly advocated by the Voeckell dissent, the rule
has an obvious defect: if the jury is split eleven to one, agreement might come
soon after any additional instruction; if the division is seven to five, agreement
may take longer. Thus the instruction would be held bad in, the first situation.
and good in the second, though coercion could have been effected in both
instances. Despite this fault the test is not entirely without merit where the
later deliberation is long. Attempted coercion would usually be unsuccessful
against five minority jurors. At least one of them would probably remain
adamant until convinced on the merits. However, when only one or two
jurors are conscientiously holding out, the time required for agreement might
depend less on the merits of the jury-room arguments and more on the
stamina of a single person. On the other hand, since strength of character
varies so greatly, a very pointed instruction may coerce no one while a mild
one might coerce several jurors. A court applying this arbitrary standard
would not know whether its holding on coercion was determined by the
split at the time of the instruction or by what effect those directions actually
had on the jurors. In either event the merits of the instruction would not
be passed upon.
An objective test which neither avoids the merits of the instruction nor
circumvents the jury is that requiring examination only of the instruction
itself. One form of this rule requires reversal if any reasonable interpreta7
tion of the judge's statements would cause an unwilling change of vote.
Another form calls for reversal if the instruction has a "tendency to interfere with the free and unbiased judgment of the jurors."18 The admonition in
the present case was held good because it had no "tendency to make any juror
yield his conscientious convictions."' 9 The court could hardly have meant that
the instruction had no tendency to make any juror yield, since ordinarily the
judges would know none of the jurors. Consequently, any reasonable juror
16. The theory is that a short period of deliberation eliminates the possibility that the
jury was directed into new channels of reasoning. Dejarnette v. Cox, 128 Ala. 522, 29
So. 618 (1900) (Deliberation had lasted "all day" and agreement was reached "very
soon" after the additional instruction. The instructions were, therefore, held bad.);
McCarthy v. Odell, 202 App. Div. 784, 195 N.Y. Supp. 80 (1922) (The time intervals:
four hours, and ten minutes. The instruction was held bad.) State v. Rogers, 56 Kan.
362, 43 Pac. 256 (1896) (Since the jury deliberated for twenty-four hours but did not
reach agreement until the "next day" after the instruction, it was upheld).
17. The "true test" is "that wherever the language of the trial judge reasonably
permits any interpretation or construction that could influence one of the jurors to yield
tis conscientious conviction of the truth for the mere sake of agreement and accept the
views of the majority, or wherever the judge suggests that the jurors might arbitrarily
compromise, divide, or yield their individual views in order that a verdict might be
found, it constitutes reversible error, since it in some degree detracts from that absolute
fairness intended to be secured by jury trials." Peavy v. Clemons, 10 Ga. App. 507, 73
S.E. 756, 759 (1912).
18. State v. Nelson, 181 Mo. 340, 347, 80 S.W. 947, 948 (1904).
19. State v. Voeckell, 210 P.2d at 975 (Ariz. 1949).
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probably was meant. Similarly, the substitution of "apt to cause" for
"tendency to make" would state a more practicable measure because very slight
coercion would create such a tendency while a more appreciable degree of
-duress is apt to cause a change of vote.
Adherence to this objective test will partly answer the arguments of the
writers' discontent with the jury system because they believe that a few jurors
in each panel impede justice by lacking the ability or disposition to decide
complicated cases. 20 Since the test is predicated on a reasonable-man standard
rather than on one catering to the weakness, stubbornness, or inability of the
most unworthy jurors, it disregards the cause of a vote change by the type
person who stimulates the fears of these writers. This standard does not
involve considerations such as the evidence, time-element, or surrounding
circumstances which are of almost undeterminable relevance to the issue of
coerciveness. 21 Nor is there the danger, iniherent in the evidence-examination
test, of substituting the court's judgment for that of the jury. Finally, this is
the only test requiring a holding on the merits of the instruction. Therefore
it appears to be preferable.
Courts and counsel have frequently failed to distinguish between coercive
instructions and those stating improper deliberative methods. 22 A determination that an instruction is not coercive should not automatically make it good:
it might contain incorrect law regarding the manner of jury deliberations.
For instance, an instruction requesting jurors to compromise would not coerce
20. See note 3 supra.
21. In Peterson v. United States, 213 Fed. 920 (9th Cir. 1914), the court took into
,consideration the personalities and standings in the community of the defendants, that
-convictions for the particular crime (cattle theft) were not hard to secure, and that the
-prosecution faced no popular prejudice. The dissent in the Voeckell case considered the
nature of the crime and the fact that the attack was unprovoked, the publicity given the
case, defendant's failure to deny the physical acts he was accused of, the fact that insanity was the sole defense, and the lateness of the hour at which the instruction was given.
Even in cases of threats to keep the jury impaneled for a long time, it is impossible
to determine coercion considered as a force actually causing a change of vote by a minority juror of temperament unknown to the appellate court. Barring the possibility of
questioning the jurors themselves-an obviously unworkable solution-there is left for the
court the task of determining not actual coercion but coerciveness: the probability of
coercion having been the cause of vote changing. Therefore, considerations such as
those mentioned in the Peterson case and in the dissenting opinion of the Voeckell case
are either susceptible of such doubtful and even divergent interpretations or of such
slight bearing on coerciveness that they may serve only to confuse that question.
22. The dissenting judge in State v. Voeckell, 210 P. 2d at 979 (Ariz. 1949), relied on
cases involving both types of instructions: Olguin v. People, 115 Colo. 147, 170 P.2d 285
(1946) ; State v. Moon, 20 Idaho 202, 117 Pac. 757 (1911) (deliberative instructions)
and Medows v. State, 182 Ala. 51, 62 So. 737 (1913) (coercion alone). See also Picken
v. Miller, 59 Ind. App. 115, 120, 108 N.E. 968, 970 (1915).
Of course some instructions contain both possible coerciveness and supposed aids on
deliberation. The suggested test should be applied to these mixed instructions as well as
to those instructions which possibly involve but one of the two elements. And a mixed
instruction should not be approved merely because it contains some correct deliberative
instructions. See People v. DeMeaux, 194 Mich. 18, 160 N.W. 634 (1916).
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the minority but might cause willing changes of votes in disregard of the
facts of the case.2 3 Likewise, instructions inviting though not demanding a
24
majority verdict could produce a vote change not based on determined facts.
There should be a new trial if the instruction states procedure by which jurors
would render a verdict to which they even willingly agree without unanimous
belief in its correctness.

2

5

The court in the principle case based its holding on the wording of the
instruction. It was validly determined that there was neither comment on the
evidence nor inherent coerciveness. 2 However, the opinion failed to recognize
that the trial judge's direction-that doubts as to Voeckell's guilt be considered
possibly unreasonable unless subscribed to by a majority of the jurors-stated
an incorrect deliberative process. "If one juror is to yield his judgment to that
of another, there must be some mode of determining [other than by count of
the jurors] which of them may adhere to his judgment and which must
yield." 27 A juror should determine the reasonableness of a doubt from the
evidence and logic of the arguments. But the court favored the instruction
because "It counsels the jurors . . . to question the tenability of preconceived

opinions, prejudices, and fetiches that are not actuating the majority ..
"28
Included in this position lies an unfounded assumption that the majority had
submerged these evils by the "application of reason" while only the minority
acted arbitrarily.
The error of the deliberative method suggested to the Voeckell jury was
not cured by the statement that jurors should not give up conscientious
convictions, for the judge directed his advice to the minority. Though much of
what the trial judge said might be proper, for example, in a board of directors
23. Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420 (1873) ; State v. Bybee, 17 Kan. 462 (1877) ; People
v. Engle, 118 Mich. 287, 76 N.W. 502 (1898) ; State v. Ivanhoe, 35 Ore. 150, 57 Pac.
317 (1899).
That jurors apparently do follow illegal deliberative-process instructions is shown
by the many cases in which the trial judges have suggested compromise. In the Clem
case, s upra, the evidence was that the defendant was either guilty of first degree murder
or was completely innocent. The jury gave a verdict of guilt of second degree murder.
S'milar compromises occurred in the Bybee and Ivanhoe cases, supra. In Peterson v.
United States, 213 Fed. 920 (9th Cir. 1914), the jurors compromised by finding one defendant guilty and another innocent.
24. Mt. Hamill State Savings Bank v. Hughes, 196 Iowa 861, 195 N.W. 589 (1923).
25. Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420 (1873) ; Peavy v. Clemons, 10 Ga. App. 507, 73 S.E.
756 (1912) ; State v. Ivanhoe, 35 Ore. 150, 57 Pac. 317 (1899).
26. The only part of the Vockell instruction, see note 1 supra, not relating to a suggested deliberative process was the statement that the case would probably not be submitted to a more intelligent jury and that clearer evidence would probably not be produced in a new trial. Though such a statement may have a slight tendency to cause a
change of vote, it is doubtful that it would be apt to coerce a reasonable man.
27. Picken v. Miller, 59 Ind. App. 115, 123, 108 N.E. 968, 971 (1915); Clem v.
State, 42 Ind. 420 (1873).
28. State v. Voeckell, 210 P. 2d at 975 (Ariz. 1949).
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decision, the deliberations of a jury must be more careful, "9 especially in
criminal cases. Advice to "listen with a disposition to be convinced" and not
to give up "conscientious convictions" can convey various ideas to reasonable
men. Jurors should give up views and even conscientious convictions when
they discover them to be unreasonable, but they should not try to convince
themselves that they are wrong.30 The instruction here was confusing, too
long, and partially contradictory, but its major defect was in directing one
part of the jury, the minority, to deliberate in a manner different from that
required of the other jurors. 31
Instructions of the Voeckell type have been ruled on only once by a
higher Indiana court. 32 The Appellate Court in that case properly looked only
at the instruction. Since there are no Indiana Supreme Court precedents
squarely in point, that tribunal is in an excellent position to select the best
test for determining coerciveness. 33 An instruction should be reviewed in its
29. Instructions likening jury deliberation to business transactions have been held
erroneous in Burroughs v. Southern Colonization Co., 96 Ind. App. 93, 173 N.E. 716
(1930) ; Churchill v. Woodruff, 66 Ind.. App. 241, 118 N.E. 136 (1917) ; Richardson v.
Coleman, 131 Ind. 210, 29 N.E. 909 (1892).
30. An instruction that "each juror must try to be persuaded" has a "tendency to
make the jurors feel that they must give way to their honest convictions upon the merits,
and agree with the majority." People v. Engle, 118 Mich. 287, 291, 76 N.W. 502, 503
(1898). To tell the minority that "if they do not agree with the majority, they should
'doubt the correctness of their own judgment' and 'should therefore scrutinize the evidence more closely . . .' has a tendency to cause the minority to surrender conscientious
convictions rather than to proceed with the laborious and uncertain task of convincing
themselves that they [are] wrong." Held: Error. Clemens v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
Co., 163 Iowa 499, 509, 144 N.W. 354, 357 (1913). But cf. Allen v. United States, 164
U.S. 492 (1896) ; Suslak v. United States, 213 Fed. 913 (9th Cir. 1914).
31. The following is suggested as an effective instruction to hung juries: "Agreement should not be impossible. To achieve it, each juror-whether undecided or in favor
of one side or the other-must listen fairly to the arguments of the others. Each fact
upon which it is necessary for you to base your vote should be considered in the light of
these arguments. If there are certain facts on which you are in agreement, you may be
able to go forward from there in reconsidering the facts upon which you have disagreed.
If another juror points out what he considers a weakness in your argument, consider his
view fairly to determine if, after all, your position is not incorrect. If you see after
careful consideration that your view is incorrect, discard it. By this process you should
be able to determine each fact step by step until you have reconstructed the case as you
can conscientiously believe it to be true. When you have done this, apply the law to the
facts. You may be able to reach a verdict in this manner."
32. Picken v. Miller, 59 Ind. App. 115, 108 N.E. 968 (1931). Indiana has also had
one case of threats to keep the jury impaneled until they should reach a verdict. The
threats were held to be reversible error. Terre Haute & Indianapolis R. Co. v. Jackson,
81 Ind. 19 (1881).
33. As to the deliberative process, one test other than that used by the Appellate
Court in Picken v. Miller, 59 Ind. App. 115, 108 N.E. 968 (1931), has been used by the Indiana Supreme Court: "If the language used is capable of different constructions, the construction is to be preferred which will lead to an affirmance unless it can reasonably be
said that the instruction was calculated to mislead the jury. . . . The test question in
every case is: Was the jury misled?" Knapp v. State, 168 Ind. 153, 159, 79 N.E. 1076,
1078 (1906). The court assumes, in the use of this test, that the jurors are men of common sense. The test is of doubtful validity and should not be followed, because calcula-
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entirety to decide whether it would be apt to cause a reasonable man to surrender unwillingly his opinion. If the determination is that no coercion was
inherent, a further ruling is called for on the deliberative processes suggested
by the trial judge. Either coerciveness or wrong directions as to deliberative
methods should warrant a new trial. 34

CONFLICT OF LAWS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON FOREIGN
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS UNDER NONRESIDENT MOTOR STATUTES
With the advent of interstate travel by automobile, legislative action
regulating the use of the highways by non-resident motorists became necessary. 1 Due to the transitory presence of the out-of-state motorist following
an accident, a resident plaintiff, in order to bring suit, was forced to transport
witnesses and evidence into the domiciliary state of the non-resident. In many
cases this either precluded recovery or, where the claim was small, made such
action impractical. Early attempts to alleviate this situation culminated in the
passage of the first modern non-resident motorist statute by Massachusetts
in 1923.2 Proceeding on the theory that by using the highways a non-resident
impliedly consents to the appointment of a state official as his agent for service of process, the Act permitted an injured party to obtain jurisdiction over
an out-of-state motorist in the courts of Massachusetts. The United States
Supreme Court, recognizing the-state interest in the enforcement of regulations
reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of those who use its highways, upheld the constitutionality of this statute in Hess v. Pawloski. With4
in a few years all of the states enacted similar legislation.
tions to mislead are immaterial and the error is prejudicial no matter how good the judge's
intentions. State v. Nelson, 181 Mo. 346, 80 S.W. 947 (1904).
34. An Indiana statute, though it has apparently not been used in the problem of
coercion, might be of some aid in solving the problem in criminal cases. "The court shall
grant a new trial to the defendant for the following causes, or any of them: . . .Fifth:
When the verdict has been found by means other than a fair expression of opinion on
the part of all the jurors." IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1942) § 9-1903. This statute'
would certainly seem to outlaw coercive instructions and possibly ones stating erroneous
methods of deliberation.

1. For example, in 1915, the state's power to require that non-resident motorists
have a driver's license was upheld. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915). Then,
in 1916, a New Jersey law requiring that non-residents appoint a state officer as agent
for service of process, prior to use of the state highways, was upheld as a valid exercise
of the power of the state to regulate the use of its highways. Kane v. New Jersey,
242 U.S. 160 (1916).
2. GEN. LAWS oF MASS., c. 90 (1921), as amended by c. 431, § 2 (1923) (MAss.
ANN. LAWS, c. 90, §§ 3-3B (1933)).
3. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).

4. The Indiana non-resident motorist statute, IND. STAT. ANN. § 47-1043 (Burns
Supp. 1949) is typical and provides as follows: "The operation by a non-resident, or by
his duly authorized agent, of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway of this state

